INTRODUCTION

Anarchism is not a fixed, self-enclosed social system, but rather a definite trend in the historic development of mankind, which, in contrast with the intellectual guardianship of all clerical and governmental institutions, strives for the free unhindered unfolding of all the individual and social forces in life. Even freedom is only a relative, not an absolute concept, since it tends constantly to become broader and to affect wider circles in more manifold ways. For the Anarchist, freedom is not an abstract philosophical concept, but the vital concrete possibility for every human being to bring to full development all the powers, capacities, and talents with which nature has endowed him, and turn them to social account. The less this natural development of man is influenced by ecclesiastical or political guardianship, the more efficient and harmonious will human personality become, the more will it become the measure of the intellectual culture of the society in which it has grown.¹

According to Rudolf Rocker, anarchism is a possibility. It is a route to a richer, more interesting and freer future, an opportunity for spiritual and political development: an unclosed ideal, an open choice, an untried and attractive possibility. The anarchist steps into the future and creates a new future without rule.

The role of the social scientist who examines anarchism is much more prosaic. First, he or she can seek to outline the theoretical system and the various types of anarchism—the approaches of the political philosopher and the political scientist.

Second, he or she can study when, in what form, how and why anarchism emerges in particular historical situations, which social stra-
ta present anarchist demands, and how the anarchist movement is organized internally. These are the questions typically asked by the sociologist, particularly the political and historical sociologist.

The third approach involves more complete description and documentation of actual anarchist movements and their location within the societies of their time. This is the task of the historian of anarchism. Naturally, these three approaches do not exclude each other, but rather in part overlap, and they leave space for psychological and economic inquiry into the nature both of the anarchist and of anarchism.

Our approach in this book is avowedly interdisciplinary. This choice of approach is motivated by the need to offer a unified account of the chain of our ideas: it allows us to differentiate logical analytical units and to identify the most fruitful analytical means of viewing them. The book is divided into three major parts, in which—in varying proportions, but always consciously—we utilize the viewpoints of political philosophy, historical sociology and the history of ideas.

The approach of part one is essentially that of political philosophy. We examine the components of anarchist social theory and seek to develop a systematic analytical framework. On the basis of this, we differentiate the varying types and manifestations of anarchist theory. We then outline various possible criticisms of anarchism and seek to locate anarchism among the other major political ideologies.

In part two we track the history of anarchism in Hungary up to the present day. Generally, this subject is treated only fleetingly in the historical literature; occasionally it is covered in detail; often it is not dealt with at all. Our approach here, as befits the subject matter, is primarily that of historical sociology and the history of ideas. After an introduction outlining the social basis of the international anarchist movement, we consider in separate subchapters the following waves of anarchist or anarchist-influenced activity in Hungary:

1. The activities of the radical, “actionist” workers’ party of 1883–84;
2. The millenarian, agrarian-socialist movements of the Hungarian Great Plain in 1897–98 and the influence of Jenő Henrik Schmitt;
3. The Kropotkin-style communist anarchism of the 1900s (Count Ervin Batthyány) and the French-influenced anarcho-syndicalism of the same period (Ervin Szabó);
4. The relationship between political and artistic avant-gardism
(Lajos Kassák, Emil Szittyia); the “moralist revolutionaries” movement and its theoretical dilemmas, and questions relating to “ethical socialism,” and finally,

5. The ideology and organizational efforts of the Budapest Anarchist Group, led by Károly Krausz, during the period of the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic.

To ease the reader’s comprehension and allow the separation of different analytical points of view, we divide these parts into chapters and sub-chapters addressing particular time periods or particular questions relating to the movements and to social theory. We discuss the Hungarian movements and theories in international perspective, drawing on the examples of West, South and East European anarchist movements.

According to our thesis there were three types of anarchist directions developing on the European continent at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first decades of the twentieth century. In western Europe, where democracy and similar constitutional states based on a rule of law first came into being, anarchism evolved in opposition to democracy. Anarchism was an expression of disappointment with the unsatisfactory, petty and obscure developments of democracy that seemed to favor a small elite group. This resulted in the appearance of syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism that wished to implement radical social changes with extra-parliamentary methods, such as the economic battles of the labor unions through strikes. In the more northern European countries where the collective structures of the workers and the Social Democratic parties were strong, anarchism remained weak. In contrast, in the southern European capitalisms where the work force was still divided into smaller units, where manufacturing still had strong guild-like features and where the individual workers still enjoyed greater independence, anarchism made greater inroads than did social democracy.

The situation was quite different in eastern Europe, including the Ukraine and the European parts of Russia and the Balkans. Here the achievement of democracy was not a realistic possibility. There was little or no socialist labor movement, there was a preponderance of peasants and agrarians and there was very little modernization and urbanization. In these countries anarchism appeared as a messianic message
of salvation and the illusive hope of the oppressed masses for an ideal, redeeming and just society. In these societies the state was either identical with tsarist dictatorship or was tightly associated with the unrestrained activities of a powerful group that took control, not for the common good but strictly for their selfish, mafia-like aggrandizement. Here the revolt was against power and against the state and, because the introduction of democracy was not a realistic consideration, it seemed that excessive confidence in the possibility of achieving an ideal anarchist society was not unreasonable.

Between these two European regions, in central Europe, most of the area was taken up by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with its dualistic system that was constitutional and liberal but definitely not a democracy. In central Europe the ideal democracy was always just a few steps away. The majority of the politically aware people believed that, with a successful outcome of the present political and franchise battles, democracy would become a reality. The liberal thinkers in central Europe, sympathizing with anarchy were characteristically vacillating between the ideals of democracy and anarchy and finally arrived at a hybrid solution between the two. They considered a “true democracy” a situation where several principles of anarchy, like the anarchist interpretation of autonomy, could be accommodated. They also melded anarchism with democratic and liberal socialist elements. In the examination of the historical turning point of Hungarian anarchism we repeatedly came to the conclusion that we were dealing with a recurrent, multifaceted appearance of a peculiarly central European dilemma. We will revert to this problem in several chapters of our book.

Finally, in part three we analyze the present state of anarchism. We examine first the ideology of Hungarian liberal socialism from the viewpoint of the anarchist problematique. By way of conclusion, we consider in turn a range of contemporary international social movements as the heirs to various currents and outlooks within anarchism. This chapter thus returns to the territory of political philosophy and social theory, though this is supplemented by the macrosociological analysis of the new social movements.

Secondly, we examine the ideology of Hungarian liberal socialism of the twentieth century from the viewpoint of the anarchist problematique. The ideas of two outstanding political thinkers, Oszkár Jászi and
István Bibó, are analyzed here. Given their interest toward the realization of an anti-authoritarian democracy which is based on the voluntary cooperation of free associations, we label them, and their “anti-political” followers, as “anarcho-democrats.” The distinctive feature of their theoretical approach lies in its paradoxical, sometimes controversial, understanding of democracy and freedom. They wished for a democratic society but they shared a deep suspicion concerning any political power. They might have preferred a “democracy without power,” that is, a free society which could have equally represented political freedom and freedom from politics.

Third, we examine the “anarchist mentality” and consider a range of contemporary international social initiatives and movements as the heirs to various currents and outlooks within anarchism. These include, among others currents, postmodernism, feminism, environmentalism, and municipalism. This chapter thus returns to the territory of political philosophy and social theory, though this is supplemented by the macro-sociological analysis of the new social movements.

By way of conclusion, we outline our view on the the future perspectives of anarchism in the international arena and summarize the lessons of Hungarian anarchism, and the paradigmatic, “anarcho-democrat” position of its exponents existed in the past hundred-and-thirty years.

The authors of these lines are not anarchists. We do not believe that anarchism gives the best available answers to the questions of our time — whether in the East or in the West. We do think, however, that, beyond their theoretical and historical interest, the critical viewpoints of the anarchists invite a productive debate and demand new answers, both in today’s Western post-industrial societies and in the postcommunist societies of the East.

The thoughts and conclusions gathered in this volume are the result of many years’ deliberations. János Bak, Tibor Hajdú, György Litván, Mária Ludassy, and the recently deceased Miklós Szabó and László Csontos shared their views of our work with us. We appreciate their comments. For the help in arranging the American edition of this work special thanks are due to Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, Gábor Vermes, and Susan Glanz.

We also wish to say a heartfelt and loud thank you to Alan Renwick for the excellent translation and to Peter Pastor, Eszter Kollár, and Edit Völgyesi for their editorial assistance.

Budapest, 1 February 2005
Anarchism has taken many forms and overlapped with and partly merged into many other movements during its almost two-hundred-year history. In Rudolf Rocker’s words, modern anarchism is the “confluence of the two great currents which during and since the French Revolution have found such characteristic expression in the intellectual life of Europe: Socialism and Liberalism.”

From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, three basic categories can be differentiated among the various forms of anarchism: (1) collectivist anarchism, (2) individualist anarchism, (both among non-religious anarchisms), and (3) religious anarchism. These three basic types relate in a variety of ways to the traditions of socialism and liberalism.

The currents of thought contained within the collectivist category collectivist anarchism, communist anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism—lie closer to socialism: they all rebel against the institutions of exploitation and rule. According to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Johann Most, Emma Goldman and others, capitalism has expropriated the heritage of liberalism—the essence of which is the concept of freedom—and restricted it to the economy. The concept of freedom can be fulfilled and a free society created only by destroying the institutions of rule. Since exploitation too is a type of rule economic rule a free society can be achieved only by crushing state-political rule and abolishing private ownership. In conformity with the rest of the anarchist system of ideas, however, the collectivist orientations reject violent means of creating the new society and
strongly oppose the authority-based, centralizing political revolution urged by socialism and communism.

Collectivist forms of anarchism are close to liberal and alternative models of socialism which emphasize values of decentralization, voluntary cooperation, human dignity, incremental cognitive transformation, and free education.

Within the second basic form of anarchism individualist anarchism the legacy of the liberal tradition is stronger. The early individualist anarchist Max Stirner’s “egoist” conception emphasizes self-interest, self-fulfilment and the importance of freedom from all constraints against the illegitimate demands of the state and the political system. Individualist liberalism became particularly strong in the United States reflecting, and closely tying to, that country’s liberal political tradition. Josiah Warren, Lysander Spooner, Benjamin R. Tucker, Stephen Pearl Andrews, William B. Greene, and others attacked not only the state but also the legal system and everyday rules that were central to the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

In addition, the representatives of libertarianism who are closest to individualist anarchism view any limitation upon the capitalist economy as an infringement of liberty, and thus urge the creation of “anarcho-capitalism.” In the political sphere, individualist anarchism—in harmony with the whole anarchist thought system exceeds the traditional liberal antistatism. While liberalism argues for a minimal state, anarchism advocates the state’s complete abolition. The anarchists would amend Thomas Jefferson’s contention that the best state is the one that governs least to claim that the best state is the one that does not govern at all or that does not exist.

The third basic type of anarchism refers back not to socialism or liberalism, but to religious roots, generally to the traditions of the major world religions. This orientation emphasizes the equal fallibility of human beings and the importance and force of a spiritual life, and on the basis of religious or mystical tradition shows the illegitimacy of political power and all forms of oppression. Among the representatives of religious anarchism, Leo Tolstoy developed the ideas of early, evangelical Christianity and the Hungarian Jenő Henrik Schmitt those of Gnosticism, while Martin Buber, and Mahatmá Gandhi, they themselves not anarchists, renewed the traditions of Judaism and Hin-
duism respectively through social philosophies that were linked to anarchist thinking. The common feature of these endeavours is their emphasis upon complete nonviolence—contrary to other anarchist orientations that do not unconditionally reject the use of revolutionary violence against the state. The nonviolence of religious anarchism has been espoused and perpetuated by pacifist and peace movements appearing during different periods.13

The differentiation of the above three basic types is not, however, sufficient for understanding the diversity of orientations within anarchism—it can only be the first attempt. Though anarchism can be interpreted as the radical extension of the triad of values at the heart of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, fraternity—that system of ideas cannot be placed mechanically within the triangular model of liberalism-socialism-conservatism: it cannot be described simply by differentiating the concepts of individualism, collectivism, and religiosity.

For a more precise analysis of the phenomenon of anarchism, we thus require an analytical framework that incorporates a variety of viewpoints and clarifies the differences within each basic type, and that illuminates the cases lying between those types. Thus, from a methodological point of view, the typology and the analytical framework are not the same. The typology consists of types displaying mutually exclusive properties. The analytical framework only helps to separate out certain characteristic signs and properties, taking into account the fact that some basic elements of these properties coincide and thus in part overlap.

In what follows we go beyond the above tripartite division and seek to develop an analytical framework comprising five dimensions.14 The model uses five pairs of values to symbolize the dilemmas facing anarchists, and thus offers five viewpoints for the analysis of anarchist theories.

1.1. Individualism versus Collectivism

The first value pair is individualism and collectivism. As already stated, these values signify two fundamentally differing types, movements and traditions within anarchism. Individualist anarchism in the-
oretical terms lies close to classical liberalism, while in its actions it is linked to movements of civil disobedience. But while civil disobedience “seeks change in some state law or policy” and “its followers voluntarily and without opposition bear their punishment” from the state, the individualist anarchists strive for the abolition of the state and of politics. Since they do not recognize any legitimate power above themselves, they may use the publicity of a trial for anti-régime and anti-state agitation. While disobedience movements recognize the existence of state norms even when violating them, anarchism questions the whole system of norms based upon rule. We can find the philosophy of individuality in radical form in the cases of Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche, in the images of the “egoist” or “superhuman person” (Übermensch). According to Stirner, the state is based upon collectivism, which hinders individual action. In Nietzsche’s words, “Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous.” But Stirner and Nietzsche do not have identical ideas. Stirner’s egocentric system is valid for every person, and the various self-interests coincide in an association of egoists—in anarchy. By contrast, Nietzsche’s exalted individual is chosen and conscious of his superiority to others; this image is thus not anarchist. In the characteristic formulation of the American anarchist Benjamin R. Tucker, meanwhile, “...individuality and its right of assertion are indestructible except by death.”

While individualist anarchism became a powerful force, under the name of libertarianism, above all in the United States, the collectivist interpretation of anarchist thought can be found primarily among Russian thinkers, and this tradition became dominant also in western and southern Europe. According to Bakunin, the new society will emerge through the struggle of the subjugated and often marginalized strata, which will revolutionize the whole people. Its fundamental unit is the land collective based on communal ownership (the historical model for which is the Russian village commune, the obshchina), and the federal forms propounded by Proudhon are based upon this. Kropotkin—in sharp contrast to Stirner—charges the state with promoting the development of unbridled, spiritually limited individualism. In place of the social-Darwinist principle of mutual struggle (Herbert Spencer), he advocates the natural law of mutual help, and thus prefers Proudhon’s
legacy of mutualism over individual liberalism. He contends that the cooperation and integration that he considers desirable can best be achieved in the alliance of village and town communities. In Tolstoy too, “sacred communities” appear as the bearers of the new morality and as the antithesis of the “Machiavellian state” and the existing, pseudo-Christian society.

1.2. Moral versus Political Ways to Social Revolution

The second dimension of our analytical framework relates to anarchist conceptions of revolution. Anarchists agree that social rather than political revolution is needed, but they differ on whether this social revolution can be initiated and executed through moral or political means.

According to one conception, because the inner nature of the human individual is predisposed to good, the anarchist goal must be achieved through moral revolution. The primary instruments in this are culture, upbringing, and the setting of a personal example. Besides Elisée Reclus, Tolstoy and Jenő Henrik Schmitt, many believe that social change remains superficial so long as the people themselves do not, through the “revolution of the soul,” consciously demand the fundamental transformation of society. For example, the founders of the artists’ colony in the Hungarian town of Gödöllő at the turn of the twentieth century (Sándor Nagy, Aladár Kőrösfői-Kriesch) were convinced that the new art, new way of life and new aesthetic that they represented could directly influence the worldviews of the people. For the Spanish anarchist pedagogue Francisco Ferrer, meanwhile, revolutionary education was inconceivable in the existing institutional system; new schools were required before the new ideas would take root. These thinkers saw the actionist slogan of the “propaganda by the deed” too as relating to moral action, with the help of which, in Schmitt’s words, “they could deliver a crushing judgement upon the sordidness of this world.”

According to the second approach, a social revolution initiated through political means is necessary. In theory, these thinkers (Bakunin, Johann Most, Kropotkin) reject the politics-led society, but they recognize that the call for the overthrow of the existing govern-
ment and régime and the organization of action, however moral its motivation, is markedly political activity. In Bakunin’s version, revolution can come about through the spontaneous action of groups and masses, and anarchist organization should act as a catalyst hastening this process. The influence of this idea was strong among the “primitive rebels” of messianic peasant anarchism, in certain urban petty-bourgeois movements, and in the spontaneous activism of the new-left movements that preserve the anarchist tradition (such as the Louise Michel group, the March 22nd Movement and the Vive la Révolution group, all active in 1968 France).

1.3. Religion versus Antireligion

The third element of our analytical framework is the question of the movement’s relationship to religion. Accepting the strong anticlerical legacy of the French Revolution, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin and Kropotkin regard religion as an absolute concept that limits the freedom of the person; they are thus militant atheists. For Bakunin, an indispensable part of freedom is “the rebellion of the human individual against every form of authority, divine or human, collective or individual.” In his view, a person must be free, because he or she is born free—and thus God cannot exist. The Hungarian Ervin Batthyány directly contrasts “theocratism” with anarchism, and considers that while theocratism seeks the origin of social harmony in a higher being, a central force, an abstract law—that is, outside the phenomenal world—anarchism sees the source of harmony in individuals themselves.

The alternative strain of anarchism, by contrast, makes reference to the basic precepts of Christ’s teaching, to primitive Christianity and to fundamental concepts of other beliefs, and it sets as its goal the renewal of religion. It contends, for example, that Christ’s teachings are best represented not by church norms and institutions that have hardened into malformed conventions but by the ideas of anarchist social organization. Its representatives thus have an anticlerical orientation based upon religion. Georg Simmel analyses the motivations behind these movements of religious renewal in the following terms:

It is true that the difficulty of reconciling equality before God with
the immeasurable diversity of individuals has led to that uniformity of religious achievement which has turned much of Christian life into mere schematism. Christians have failed to take into account all the individualism inherent in the Christian concept of salvation, the idea that each person should make the most of his own talent; they have been demanding of everyone a single, uniform goal and identical behavior instead of asking every person simply to give of himself. Anything that is globally uniform must remain superficial to an individual’s personality. That oneness which united the faithful, the equality of perfect souls, consists only in the permeation of each individual’s outward actions with the idea that is peculiar to himself; yet the actual context of each idea may be worlds apart. Jesus indicates in several instances how much he values the diversity of individual potential within human beings, but at the same time how little this affects the equality of the final outcome of life.

Each of the religion-renewing anarchists is the prophet of a new religion proclaiming nondenominationalism. Tolstoy’s Christianity returned to early Christianity; Schmitt’s “Religion des Geistes” is the doctrine of mind, love and divine self-knowledge. Mahatmá Gandhi, who is close to anarchism on many points, argues that religion ties us indissolubly to eternal truth. Similarly, Martin Buber’s view is that the society to be created on the basis of reinterpreted human relations could be the “new Jerusalem” in the history of humanity.

1.4. Violence versus Nonviolence

Our fourth dimension concerns anarchism’s relationship to violence: can a harmonious society be created through violence or not? Does the end justify the means or not? The anarchists already had to deal with this basic problem in the nineteenth century—when they could not learn from the sobering experiences of the history of the communist movement—and they offered differing responses to it.

The “spontaneist-actionist” wing of anarchism considers violent opposition to a state and legal order that institutionalizes and monopolizes violence to be justified. It sees the “propaganda by the deed” as
implying violent attacks and revolutionary direct action. Stirner observes sceptically that “a handful of power is worth more than a sackful of truth,” and thus argues that this power can be countered only if everyone takes responsibility for his or her own interests without moral constraint. In Stirner’s view, freely expressed egoism and an open system of self-interest can present a barrier to political power. According to Bakunin, the creation of a new society must be preceded by total destruction developing out of spontaneous action—and this in itself is already a founding act. The French writer Jean Grave formulates the point pragmatically when he states “what we expect from violence is that it will clear away every obstacle from our path.” The anarchist assassins of the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, the resolute representatives of the “propaganda by the deed”—some of them Hungarian—argued that “against tyranny, every means is legitimate,” that “violence can be fought only with violence,” and that individual actions are the harbingers of social revolution. But they were quickly to be disappointed in this belief.

In contrast to this, principled nonviolence is avowed by those anarchists who advocate internal moral liberation—by the apostles of the principle of non-cooperative collective disobedience. We find this principle among the religious messianic movements and in the American libertarian tradition. In their view, “the gentlest power is the supreme power” (Schmitt). Terrorists, they contend, are criminals not because they differ from believers in the state, but precisely because of their similarity to those believers—for the fact is that they, like the state, depend upon violence.

Believers in nonviolence regard the state as no more than the legalized form of violence, but they argue that, where the goal is the cessation of violence, violent means are impermissible. Tolstoy’s words give the essence of their claim—“do not resist evil with violence.” The basic value of nonviolence relates for William Godwin to human dignity, for Elisée Reclus to humanism, and for Tolstoy to early Christian fraternity. This orientation has often been combined—particularly since the start of the twentieth century—with open pacifism and antimilitarism.

When considering the question of violence we must mention the problem of terrorism—particularly since popular perceptions often, mistakenly, identify terrorism with anarchism. While anarchism offers
a conception of society, a theory of an ideal life, terrorism is a method that can be used in the name of many different ideologies. There are forms of terrorism associated with religious, national, ethnic, racial and class goals, and these may define themselves as right-wing or as left-wing. But the history of terrorism comprises a number of phases. We can distinguish the anarchist terrorism of the so-called “purehearted murderers” at the end of the nineteenth century, the surviving extreme-left terrorism that is a remnant of the new-left orientation of the 1960s, and, since the 1970s, the ever more noticeable separatist terrorism of, for example, the Irish, Basques, and Palestinians. State terrorism presents a distinct set of problems (in the communist countries, or, for example, in the former military dictatorships of Latin America). Anarchism has nothing in common with the often mutually connected waves of extreme-left, separatist and state terrorism. It is by definition unconnected with state terrorism, and it is tied to the new-left terrorism that emerged in the 1970s neither in its ideas, nor in its representatives. (Neither Andreas Baader, nor Ulrike Meinhof, nor Carlos, nor Ali Agca was an anarchist.) The members of the West German terrorist group, the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction), just like the Italian Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades), defined themselves as belonging to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist cells and as urban guerrillas. They strove to foment revolution based on class war, first in the developed “consumer” societies, later in the less developed countries of the Third World.

Anarchists were, however, the principal actors behind the terrorist activity of the latter part of the nineteenth century, particularly between 1880 and 1900. That anarchism and terrorism could for a period be identified with each other can be attributed to the “propaganda by the deed” that these anarchists practiced. Anarchist assassins murdered Tsar Alexander II, French President Sadi Carnot, the Austro-Hungarian Empress Elizabeth, and American President McKinley—to mention only the most famous cases. Gautier, Ravachol, Duval, Bonnot, Henry, Caserio and others were infamous figures of the time. But even then, this approach was used only by one type of anarchism, and it quickly ran out of steam. In the final analysis, the terrorist anarchist movement was rooted in the European tradition of injecting power with moral content, and it strove for the radical realization of that tradition. But the final consequence of the moral conception of the problem of power...
is to question power itself. The motivation of the anarchist assassins was not just that the dictators they killed *abused* power, but that they *used* their power, and thus became tyrants.

This is expressed by the French anarchist Louise Michel in her statement, identical with Lord Acton’s famous view, that “all power corrupts.” According to the anarchists, the representatives of power must be removed not so that a new elite, a new vanguard may step into their places, but so that *power may be abolished*. They are thus not content with placing power under democratic control, for they take it as axiomatic that where there is power there is no freedom.

For anarchists, violence, if it is necessary, can have the value only of an instrument, and it can permissibly be employed only against the representatives of the ruling institutions. Contemporary terrorism, however, sees in violence an opportunity for freedom, and thus comes to regard it as valuable in itself. Terrorism breaks with moral motivation, and, in declaring that violence can be used against the innocent, sets itself up deliberately and provocatively against the ethical judgement of the people.

The mistake made by terrorist anarchism—and later, on large scale, by Bolshevism—was its failure to recognize that not even moral motivation can justify immoral actions. But in historical terms, the interpretation of the “propaganda by the deed” as implying violence retreated very rapidly to the margins of international anarchism. Later anarchists used these experiences in turning against Bolshevism.52

1.5. *Rationalism versus Romanticism*

The fifth and final dimension of our analytical framework examines the relationship of anarchism to the conceptual pair of *rationalism* and *romanticism*. Modern political ideologies are the product of the Enlightenment, of the age when informal feudal and community relations retreated into the background in a formalized society based on commodified and monetized relations. During this period, economy and society, feudal estate and class, state and church, all separated from one another. Rationalism was oriented to the future; its vision was of a rational society in which the individual would be not merely a subject,